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Dynamic game of incomplete informationA keyword auction is conducted by Internet search engines to sell advertising slots listed on the search results
page. Although much of the literature assumes the dynamic bidding strategy that utilizes the current bids of
other advertisers, such information is, in practice, not available for participants in the auction. This paper explores
the bidding behavior of advertisers in a sealed-bid environment, where each bidder does not know the current
bids of others. This study considers secure bidding with a trial bid (SBT) as the bid adjustment process used by
the advertisers, which is functional in a sealed-bid environment. It is shown that the SBT bid adjustment process
converges to some equilibrium point in a one-shot game irrespective of the initial bid proﬁle. Simulation results
verify that a sealed-bid environment would be beneﬁcial to search engines.
© 2013 The Author. Published by Elsevier B.V. Open access under CC BY-NC-SA license.1. Introduction
Internet advertisements called sponsored links, which are shown
along with search results for a keyword or combination of keywords,
are sold through keyword auctions. Each time a user enters a search
term into a search engine such as Google, Yahoo! or Bing, an auction
is run, and advertisement positions and advertisement fees are deter-
mined based on the auction result. Over a million keyword auctions
are conducted each day all over the world, and Internet advertisements
fromkeyword auctions are a principal source of revenue for search engines.
The generalized second-price (GSP) auction and the auction
mechanisms based on it aremost widely used for selling advertisements
on Internet search engines. In the GSP, based on the bids submitted by
advertisers, ad slots are allocated according to the descending order of
the bids, that is, the top position is allocated to the bidder with the
highest bid, the second-ranked position is allocated to the bidder with
the second-highest bid, and so on. Every time a search engine user clicks
the advertisement, the advertiser pays the bidding price of the advertiser
one position lower. Thus, this is a second-price auction for selling multi-
ple objects with a one-dimensional strategy space.
Since the payment of each advertiser does not depend on his bid, but
on the bid submitted by the advertiser one position lower than his, the
GSP auction is similar to the Vickrey auction selling one object [25]. In
fact, when there is only one ad slot, the GSP auction is equivalent to. Open access under CC BY-NC-SA licenthe Vickrey auction and thus, it has the following property: submitting
the true expected revenue from the sponsored link is a dominant strat-
egy for each advertiser.
However, when there aremultiple ad slots, the GSP auction does not
retain the truth-telling property [9]. This indicates that advertisers
participating in the GSP auction have no option but to undertake the
complicated task of choosing their bids.
Edelman and Ostrovsky [8] reported that bids observed in GSP auc-
tions ﬂuctuate widely, and proposed that this could be caused by the
bidders' strategic behavior.
In this paper, I explore bidding behavior for a hypothetical keyword
auction. As explained in the previous paragraph, the bids submitted by
advertisers vary over a given period. This suggests that we should pay
attention to the dynamic aspect of bidding behavior. After describing
the bidding behavior of the advertisers in a keyword auction, I examine
whether a stable bid proﬁle exists for the bidding behavior. In the event
that it is stable, I investigate the property that the stable bid proﬁle pos-
sesses. I also explore how long it takes to realize the stable bid proﬁle.
My analysis considers a simpliﬁed model of keyword auctions.1 I
assume that the click-through rates (CTRs) of ad slots are common
knowledge. In each period, an advertiser can change his bid according
to the result of the keyword auction played in a previous period. The
information available to the advertiser is limited to his revenue, his
payment to a search engine, and the manner in which ad slots were
assigned to advertisers in a previous period. The advertiser does not1 More complicated, realistic formulations of a keyword auction have been done by, for
example [11,15,2,18].
se.
372 Y. Kamijo / Decision Support Systems 56 (2013) 371–378know the actual bids of the other advertisers. This means that adver-
tisers cannot follow the greedy bidding strategy, where in each period,
they update their bids to provide the best response to others' bids. Since
a keyword auction, in practice, is a sealed-bid second-price auction, ad-
vertisers update their bids according to the limited information.
Since 2002, both Google and Yahoo!, the two leading search engines,
have used the GSP auction mechanism.2
An important difference between the auctions conducted by
Yahoo! and Google was that Google employed a sealed-bid auction,
while Yahoo!'s auction was an open-bid auction. In Yahoo!'s key-
word auction, the current bids of advertisers were publicly provided
through the software (the View Bid Tool). However, this service was
discontinued in 2007 when Yahoo! switched its allocation rule to
mirror Google's quality-based bidding. Thus, currently, keyword
auctions managed by the two leading search engines are sealed-bid
auctions.3 Moreover, search engines generally restrict the bidding
information available to the automated bidding software and require
a review of any automated bidding code [14].
Even though the current keyword auctions are sealed-bid auctions,
most studies concerning the bidding strategy for a dynamic auction as-
sume an open-bid environment. Cary et al. [5,6] considered a type of
greedy bidding strategy. Since the payment is calculated by a second-
pricing rule, there can be multiple best-response bids even though the
best ad slot is uniquely determined. In their analysis, among the best-
response bids, the bidder was assumed to choose one bid so as to bal-
ance two objectives: to push the prices paid by the other advertisers
higher and to limit the risk that a change in other advertisers' bids
could result in the bidder paying a higher price than expected. Thus,
this bidding strategy is called balanced bidding. Bu et al. [4] analyzed
the same bidding behavior.4 In addition to the greedy bidding strategy,
other bidding strategies such as antisocial bidding have also been ana-
lyzed in the literature [3,20,28].
In this paper, a bid adjustment process in a sealed-bid environment
is analyzed.While the existing literature provides a good perspective on
how bidders change and adjust their bids in a dynamic auction, the
analysis of bidding behavior based on a more realistic setting is also en-
couraged. Even though a sealed-bid environmentmay be temporary be-
cause of the bidders' actual experience in a dynamic auction, the
question of how bidders adjust their bids and how bidders learn of
other bids is answered only by considering the sealed-bid environment.
First, I consider a conservative bidding strategy called secure bid-
ding. The idea of secure bidding was derived partly from balanced bid-
ding, which was proposed by Cary et al. [5] for the open-bid
environment. The bidder who follows secure bidding adjusts his bid,
given his revenue, his payment, and his ad slot, and never searches for
information about the bids of other advertisers. I show that there exist
multiple stable bid proﬁles against secure bidding (or the ﬁxed point
of bidding behavior according to secure bidding) and that some of
them are not an envy-free equilibrium [9,23], a Nash equilibrium, or ef-
ﬁcient. This implies that to achieve equilibrium, the searching behavior
for other bids should be incorporated.
Next, I consider the bidding behavior based on secure bidding that
entails a trial bid in a short period as a partial exploration of the
competitor's bid in one higher ad slot. I show that the ﬁxed point of se-
cure bidding with a trial bid (SBT) exists uniquely. Moreover, at the
ﬁxed point, the ad slots are efﬁciently assigned to advertisers, the bid
proﬁle is an envy-free equilibrium, and the revenue of a search engine2 Although they used the same payment rule, they follow slightly different rules for the
allocation of ad slots to advertisers. Yahoo! ranks advertisers by their bids alone, while
Google computes a quality score for each ad and ranks the advertisers by their bids and
quality scores. For the analysis of the weighted scheme for bids, see Refs. [21,22].
3 Even though a keyword auction is in practice a sealed-bid auction, services provided
by search engines such as “Bid Simulator”, might make the advertisers' environment sim-
ilar to an open-bid environment. However, the information supplied by the Bid Simulator
is the average price of each ad slot in the past and not the current bids of competitors.
4 They call this forward-looking behavior.is the same as that in the truth-telling equilibrium in the Vickrey-
Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism [25,7,17].
I also examine whether advertisers' bids converge to the stable bid
proﬁle if they update their bids repeatedly according to SBT. I consider
an asynchronous model of bid adjustment, where in each period, one
bidder is randomly selected and this bidder changes his bid according
to SBT. I show that in the resultingMarkov process, convergence occurs
with probability one in the sealed-bid repeated keyword auction. This is
similar to the observation in an open-bid environment reported by Bu
et al. [4] and Cary et al. [5].
I also consider greedy bidding in a sealed-bid environment. Since the
bids of others are not revealed to the bidder, he has to search for their
bids on his own or through an automated bidding agent. A bidder
ﬁnds others' bids randomly, and from among these, he calculates the
best ad slots to acquire and submits a secure bid for the ad slot. I show
that imperfect greedy bidding converges with probability one to the
same ﬁxed point as that in SBT.
Finally, I compare the bidding behavior in a sealed-bid environ-
ment with that in an open-bid environment using a computer simu-
lation. I compare the convergence time, search engines' revenues,
and advertisers' utilities in the SBT bid adjustment process and the
bid adjustment process in the literature. The simulation results
suggest that in the sealed-bid environment, the convergence time
becomes longer and the average revenue of search engines becomes
higher compared to the open bid environments. Thus, the sealed-bid
environment can be beneﬁcial to a search engine. However, adver-
tisers can improve payoffs by switching their bidding behavior
from SBT to the greedy bidding strategy even though the search for
other advertisers' bids is imperfect.2. A keyword auction
2.1. The environment
There are N, N ≧ 2, advertisers (bidders) participating in a keyword
auction. Each advertiser i has an expected revenue vi per ad click, called
a value, and it is assumed that v1 N v2 N … N vN. There are K ad slots
with CTR α1 ≧ α2 ≧ … ≧ αK, where αk is the estimated probability of
being clicked, or the estimated number of clicks in a given period for
an advertiser in the k-th ad slot. We also set αk = 0 for all k N K and as-
sume N ≧ K.52.2. The generalized second-price auction
Each advertiser submits a bid in the auction. Let bi be an advertiser i's
bid. I denote the bid proﬁle of N advertisers by b = (b1,…,bN).
In the GSP auction, advertisers are allocated ad slots in descending
order of their bids b1, b2,…, bN. Let d(k) denote the bidder who submits
the k-th highest bid among b. In the GSP auction, bidder d(k) acquires
ad slot k.
The advertiser obtaining the k-th ad slot pays the bid of the advertis-
er obtaining the next ad slot lower down (i.e., the k + 1-th ad slot) for
each click.
Hence, the payment is αkbd(k + 1).
To complete the deﬁnition of the payments, I assume that bd(k) = 0
if k N N. Accordingly, when K = N, the payment of d(K) is assumed to
be zero, and for k N K, bidder d(k) pays αkbd(k + 1) = 0 (as per the def-
inition of αk).5 In actual, this is not a restriction, because when N b K, it sufﬁces to redeﬁne K by
K = N.
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A bid proﬁle b (and the corresponding allocation d(.)) is an envy-
free equilibrium if the following conditions are satisﬁed:
for any k ¼ 1;2;…;K; αk vd kð Þ−bd kþ1ð Þ
 
≧ αkþ1 vd kð Þ−bd kþ2ð Þ
 
; ð1Þ
for any k ¼ 2;3; :::;K þ 1; αk vd kð Þ−bd kþ1ð Þ
 
≧ αk−1 vd kð Þ−bd kð Þ
 
;ð2Þ
if NNKð Þ for any k ¼ K þ 1;…;N; bd kð Þ ¼ vd kð Þ: ð3Þ
These conditions require that no bidder is better off by exchanging his
position with that of the bidder immediately above (Inequality (2)) or
that immediately below (Inequality (1)).
Edelman, Ostrovsky, and Schwarz [9] and Varian [23] showed
several properties of an envy-free equilibrium. First, an envy-free
equilibrium is a reﬁnement of the Nash equilibrium. Second, the allo-
cation of ad slots in an envy-free equilibrium is efﬁcient, that is, the
bidder with the k-th highest value obtains ad slot k. Third, the set
of envy-free equilibria constitutes the lattice, and the set of the util-
ity proﬁle in envy-free equilibria also forms the lattice. Fourth, the
greatest and the least elements in the lattice are the seller's
revenue-maximizing and revenue-minimizing bid proﬁles, respec-
tively. Moreover, the explicit formulae of these two bid proﬁles are
known. The revenue-minimizing bid proﬁle b∗ is obtained as follows:
bk ¼
1
αk−1
XKþ1
‘¼k
α‘−‘−α‘ð Þv‘ ð4Þ
for any k = 2, 3, …, K and any b1∗ with b1∗ N b2∗ . The revenue-
maximizing bid proﬁle b∗∗ is obtained as follows:
bk ¼
1
αk−1
XKþ1
‘¼k
α‘−1−α‘ð Þv‘−1
for any k = 2, 3,…, K and any b1∗∗with b1∗∗ N b2∗∗. From the deﬁnition of
the envy-free equilibrium, bk∗ = bk∗∗ = vk for any k N K.
The envy-free equilibrium is used to theoretically or empirically
analyze a keyword auction market.6 Using this concept, Edelman
and Schwarz [10] investigated the effect of setting a reserve price
on the revenue of the search engine, and showed that the GSP auction
with a reserve price is an optimal mechanism. Varian [24] estimated
the beneﬁt to advertisers from Internet advertising in search engines
and concluded that the beneﬁt tends to be two and three times adver-
tising expenditures. Fukuda et al. [13] checked the prediction from
envy-free equilibriumon theGSP auction and its alternative using a lab-
oratory experiment. However, there is no existing study that theoreti-
cally supports the equilibrium concept for a keyword auction in a
sealed-bid environment. This paper is the ﬁrst to investigate this.
3. Bidding behavior in the sealed-bid environment
3.1. Secure bidding
Let us consider how the advertiser who currently possesses ad slot k
adjusts his bid in the next period. An important assumption is that he
does not know the bids of any of the other bidders except for advertiser
d(k + 1), which can be guessed from his payment. This environment,
which appears to closely resemble a real keyword auction, is called the
sealed-bid environment. An environment where each bidder knows the
current bids of other bidders is called an open-bid environment. Most of6 There are studies that analyzed a keyword auction with different equilibrium con-
cepts. For example, Liu and Chen [21] used a Bayesian Nash equilibrium and Li et al. [19]
used a Nash equilibrium and its reﬁnement.the literature has analyzed bid adjustment in an open-bid environment.
In this paper, I explore bid adjustment in a sealed-bid environment.
I ﬁrst consider the following conservative bid adjustment of adver-
tisers. The idea is that advertiser i, who currently occupies ad slot k,
gradually or sharply increases his bid so as to acquire ad slot k − 1 as
long as at least the current payoff is guaranteed after obtaining the higher
ad slot. Thus, the new bid b′ i has to satisfy the following condition:
αk vi−bd kþ1ð Þ
 
≦ αk−1 vi−b
′
i
 
:
The left-hand side of the above inequality is the current payoff of ad-
vertiser i, and the right-hand side is i's worst payoff after obtaining ad
slot k-1 with new bid b′ i . The right-hand side is also interpreted as the
payoff of i when i gradually increases his bid and obtains the higher
slot at b′ i . Therefore, the bid adjustment of the conservative advertiser
is to choose the maximum bid satisfying the condition and this maxi-
mum is easily calculated as follows:
bSi k; bd kþ1ð Þ
 
¼ 1−rkð Þvi þ rkbd kþ1ð Þ;
where rk ¼ αkαk−1 and r1 is assumed to be a for some a b 1.7 This bidding is
called secure bidding (SB). I set rk = 0 for all k N K, meaning that the SB
of the advertiser iwhodoes not obtain any ad slot is biS(k,bd(k + 1)) = vi.
There are two remarks on SB. First, it depends only on the identity of
the bidder (or the value of the bidder), his current position, and his cur-
rent payment. Thus, bid adjustment via SB is possible in the sealed-bid
environment. Second, this can be interpreted as the weakly dominant
strategy conditional on the bidder trying to acquire one higher slot
k − 1. Consider a situation where advertiser i changes his bid so as to
acquire one higher ad slot k − 1, and ignore (for the moment) adver-
tisers other than i and d(k − 1) and slots other than k and k − 1. Let
bd(k − 1) be the current bid of bidder d(k − 1). Then, if bd(k − 1) ≦ biS(k,
bd(k + 1)), any new bid b
′
i of bidder i satisfying b
′
iNbd k−1ð Þ is his best re-
sponse to bd(k − 1). Further, if bd(k − 1) ≧ biS(k,bd(k + 1)), any new bid b′i
satisfying b′ibbd k−1ð Þ becomes his best response to bd(k − 1). Combining
these two observations, biS(k,bd(k + 1)) is always the best response to
the bid of the advertiser in ad slot k − 1.
3.2. Limitations of the secure bidding adjustment
A bid proﬁle b (and the corresponding allocation d(.)) is consistent
with SB if for any k = 1, 2, …, N, bd(k) = bd(k)S (k,bd(k + 1)).8 Since the
SB of advertiser i depends only on vi, the ad slot acquired by him, and
the bid of the advertiser in the one-lower ad slot, we can calculate the
bid proﬁle consistent with SB given the predetermined allocation d(.).
Therefore, assuming d(.) is predetermined, calculate the bid proﬁle b
as follows:
• k N K, bd(k) = vd(k);
• repeatedly apply bd(k) = bd(k)S (k,bd(k + 1)) from k = K to k = 1.
If bd(1) ≧ bd(2) ≧ … ≧ bd(N) holds for the resulting bid proﬁle, then this is
consistent with SB.
Consistency with SB implies that the bid proﬁle is a ﬁxed point of
the bid adjustment process in which each advertiser changes his bid
via SB in every period. The following proposition indicates that in the
ﬁxed point, the advertisers with the top K highest values obtain the
ad slots.
Proposition 1. Assume b is consistent with SB. Then, {d(1), d(2),...,
d(K)} = {1, 2,..., K}.
The proof of this proposition (and those of others) is obtained from
the appendix on this journal's web page.7 A selection of a does not affect the theoretical property of secure bidding. In [5], a is set
to 0.5. Thus, I also set a to be 0.5 to illustrate some examples of calculation.
8 If needed, we set bd(N + 1) = 0.
Fig. 1. Bidding war and cease-ﬁre when bidders use SBT (three bidders and two ad slots).
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ding of an advertiser is always less than or equal to its value and the
equality holds when i does not have an ad slot, the secure bidding of i,
i ≦ K, when i does not have any ad slot, is always greater the secure bid-
ding of j, j N K. Therefore, if b is consistent with SB, an advertiser j, j N K,
never possesses an ad slot.
Proposition 1 does not mean that ad slots are efﬁciently allocated to
advertisers in the ﬁxed point of bid adjustment via SB.
Proposition 2. Consistency with SB does not imply that b is an envy-free
equilibrium or a Nash equilibrium, or that b is efﬁcient.
Inefﬁciency of the consistent bid proﬁle occurs when two adver-
tisers, say i and j with vi N vj, retain twisted ad slots (e.g., i obtains slot
2 and j obtains slot 1) and the secure bidding of i is smaller than vj. In
such a case, the bid proﬁle is consistent with SB but j may improve its
payoff by reducing its bid in order to obtain ad slot 2.
Proposition 2 indicates that the ﬁxed point of the bid adjustment
via SB is not an envy-free equilibrium. This result contradicts previ-
ous literature that used the envy-free equilibrium as an analytical
tool because it might not be achieved in the sealed-bid environment
even though the adjustment process is long enough. In the next sec-
tion, in which I incorporate a temporal increase in a bid in order to
search for the bids of other advertisers, I propose a new bid adjust-
ment process and show that the unique ﬁxed point of the process
is an envy-free equilibrium.
4. Secure bidding with a trial bid
4.1. A trial bid
Even though the bids of others are unknown, each advertiser can ob-
tain some information on the bids of others through the list of advertise-
ments shown on the search results page. Therefore, a partial search for
the bids of others is possible in the following manner. First, a bidder in-
creases, as a trial, his bid in order to checkwhether he acquires a higher
ad slot with the new bid. If he does not obtain the higher ad slot, it
means that the prices of these slots are too expensive for him, and
thus, he changes the bid back to the previous value. On the other
hand, if the increased bid gives him a higher ad slot, he will retain the
increased bid. Therefore, the purpose of the trial bid is a partial explora-
tion of the bids of the advertisers in the higher ad slots, conducted in a
very short period that does not affect the payoff.
I consider the following kinds of trial bids. The trial bid of the adver-
tiser who currently occupies ad slot k is the bid that he would submit if
he currently has ad slot k − 1. Here, I consider secure bidding as the
basis of the bidding behavior. Therefore, the trial bid of d(k) in ad slot
k is
bTd kð Þ :¼ bSd kð Þ k−1; bd kð Þ
 
;
where bd(k) is the current bid of d(k).
The reasoning for the trial bid deﬁned above is as follows. As con-
ﬁrmed in the previous section, secure biddingmay induce an inefﬁcient
allocation of ad slots as a ﬁxed state. From the standpoint of a bidder
(say i), this means that the bidder (say j) who currently occupies the
slot above i could be inappropriate in a sense that j's value is less than
i's one, that is, vj b vi holds. So it is natural for i to increase his bid to
the level that he would choose if he were currently in j's position in
order to check whether j is appropriate to occupy the slot; if j is inap-
propriate (i.e., vj b vi), i's trial bid can beat j's secure bid, and other-
wise, j can preserve his current position against i's challenge. Thus,
a trial bid can correct the twisted neighboring bidders (d(k) and
d(k + 1) with vd(k) b vd(k + 1)) to an efﬁcient manner. In the next
subsection, I show that the ﬁxed point of the bid adjustment based
on secure bidding combined with a trial bid is always efﬁcient and
an envy-free equilibrium.4.2. The ﬁxed point of secure bidding with a trial bid
For an advertiser, secure bidding with trial bid (SBT) is a bid adjust-
ment as follows. Let b be a current bid proﬁle and i be an advertiser
obtaining ad slot k.
• If i's payoff is negative or if k N K, he submits vi and retains it.
• If i's payoff is non-negative and k ≦ K, he ﬁrst submits a trial bid
bd(k)
S (k − 1, bd(k)). Then, if he acquires the higher ad slot, he retains
the trial bid. Otherwise, he changes the trial bid to the secure bid
bd(k)
S (k,bd(k + 1)) and retains the latter.
Onemerit of SBT is that the ﬁxed point of the bid adjustment via SBT
exists uniquely and is an envy-free equilibrium.
Proposition 3. The bid proﬁle b∗ deﬁned in Eq. (4) is a unique ﬁxed point
of SBT.
As explained in the paragraph immediately following Proposition 2,
a bid proﬁle consistent with SB becomes inefﬁcient when two adver-
tisers, say i and j with vi N vj, retain the twisted ad slots and the secure
bidding of i is smaller than vj. If an advertiser uses only secure bidding,
i never beats the bid of jwhose value is less than i's value. However, if i
uses a trial bid to check whether j's position is adequate or not, i ﬁnds
that i itself is more adequate to the higher ad slot and thus beats the
bid of j. Thus, the twisted relation disappears. This reasoning implies
that theﬁxed point of SBT should be efﬁcient. The efﬁciency of a bid pro-
ﬁle together with consistency with SB uniquely determined the bid
proﬁle.
This proposition means that the ﬁxed point of SBT is an envy-free
equilibrium. Moreover, this is the revenue-minimizing (or bidder-
optimal) equilibrium among all envy-free equilibria. One important re-
mark is that b∗ is a ﬁxed point of the bidding behavior analyzed by
Cary et al. [5] and Bu et al. [4] for the open-bid environment. Therefore,
combining our results with those of the literature indicates that the sta-
ble bid proﬁle in an open-bid environment should be a unique stable bid
proﬁle in a sealed-bid environment.
4.3. A typical bidding pattern in SBT
The literature on empirical bidding behavior in a keyword auction re-
ports that the bidding war and the cease-ﬁre, that is, the phenomenon
where two or more bidders alternately and gradually raise their bids
and suddenly drop them when their bids exceed some critical value is
frequently observed. Theoretical research has shown that this can be
the result of equilibrium bidding behavior [26,27,1]. Although these ob-
servations and theoretical results are based on the open-bid environ-
ment, the bidding behavior based on SBT shows that this phenomenon
can occur even in a sealed-bid environment.
Fig. 1 plots the transition of bids via SBT across 20 periods where
there are three advertisers and two ad slots. The values of advertisers
1, 2 and 3 are 100, 95 and 10, respectively, and the CTRs of ad slots 1
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and advertisers 1 and 2 alternately change their bids via SBT. From this,
the bidding war is observed in the ﬁrst half of the entire period (until
about period 10). Advertiser 2, who has the second-highest value,
drops his bid since his trial bid never exceeds the bid of advertiser 1
for this period. After b2 is dropped, advertiser 1 follows suit and drops
his bid to a certain level, after which there is no further bid adjustment.
The bid proﬁle in the last half of the entire period is the ﬁxed point
b∗. This indicates that bid adjustment via SBT can reach the ﬁxed point
in a ﬁnite time. This point is analyzed in the next section, and it will
be shown that convergence to b∗ is guaranteed with probability one.
5. Convergence of SBT
In this section, I explore whether convergence is attained in a re-
peatedly played keyword auction. I consider a situation where in each
period, one advertiser is randomly selected and changes his bid
according to SBT. We call this bid adjustment process asynchronous
SBT dynamics. The point of concern is whether this process converges
to the ﬁxed point of the bid adjustment via SBT, that is, b∗. In asynchro-
nous SBT dynamics, from any initial bid proﬁle b0, the probability distri-
bution over the set of all bid proﬁles in the next period is uniquely
determined. Thus, this constitutes a Markov chain over the state space
Ω, whereΩ is the set of all bid proﬁles. Generally, the limit distribution
of theMarkov chain depends on the initial state. However, the following
theorem indicates that from any initial bid proﬁle, the asynchronous
SBT dynamics converges to b∗.
Theorem 1. For any bid proﬁle b0, there is a ﬁnite sequence of bid proﬁles
starting from b0 and ending with b∗ such that in each period, one bidder
changes his bid via SBT and the number of bid adjustments is less than or
equal to 3N(N + 1)/2.
This theorem means that for any bid proﬁle, there exists a small
probability greater than η N 0 that b∗ is realized. This guarantees that
the convergence to b∗ occurs almost surely from any initial bid proﬁle.
Thus, the following proposition holds.
Proposition 4. For any bid proﬁle b0, the convergence to b∗ occurs with
probability one in the asynchronous SBT dynamics.
In the literature, a slightly different type of asynchronous model is
also considered. The difference is that instead of choosing one bidder
at random in each period, one order of N bidders is chosen at random
in each “round” and the bidders change their bids sequentially in this
order. This type of dynamics is more restrictive but much seemingly
fairer than one considered in the above because in the dynamics, a bid-
der generally has a chance to adjust his bid after another bidder adjusts
a bid. As shown in the following proposition, under some condition, the
convergence to b∗ is guaranteed when a bidder follows the SBT even
though the asynchronousmodel is the one considered in this paragraph.
Proposition 5. Assume N = K and r1 ≦ r2 ≦ … ≦ rK hold. For any bid
proﬁle b0, the convergence to b∗ occurs with probability one in the asyn-
chronous dynamicswhere in each round, the order of N bidders is randomly
selected and the N bidders sequentially adjust their bids via SBT.
6. Greedy bidding in a sealed-bid environment
The idea of SBT is such that there is a short period for a partial explo-
ration of the bids of others. In this section, I explore this idea further and
assume that a bidder can ﬁnd, partly and randomly, the bids of others
before adjusting his bid. If such a search for others' bids is executed per-
fectly, the situation becomes an open-bid environment, and thus, each
bidder can follow a greedy bidding strategy, where in each period, ad-
vertisers update their bids according to the best response to the others'
bids. I ﬁrst explain the greedy bidding strategy considered by Bu et al.
[4] and Cary et al. [5,6].For any bid proﬁle b and for any advertiser i, let b−i be the bid proﬁle
except for i's bid. Assume that at b, i obtains ad slot k ≦ K. Then, given
the other bids, the price of ad slot ‘ paid by advertiser i per click is pi‘ ¼
bd ‘ð Þ for‘bkandpi‘ ¼ bd ‘þ1ð Þ for‘≧k. The asymmetry of prices between the
higher and lower ad slots comes from the fact that in order to obtain the
higher ad slot ‘, imust beat the bid of advertiser d ‘ð Þ, who currently oc-
cupies ad slot ‘. However, it is sufﬁcient for i to beat the bid of b ‘ þ 1ð Þ,
who currently occupies ad slot ‘ þ 1 to obtain the lower ad slot ‘.
The best response of i against b−i is to choose a bid to obtain ad slot
‘∗ in
argmax‘∈ 1;…;Kþ1f gα‘ vi−p‘ð Þ:
If there are multiple best-response ad slots, we assume that the adver-
tiser chooses the highest ad slot among them (i.e., smallest ‘). If the
prices of any ad slots are greater than vi, i's best-response ad slot is
K + 1.Even though the best-response ad slot ‘∗ is determined, there
are many best-response bids against b−i, that is, any bid in the interval
p‘;p‘−1ð Þ is the best response to b−i. To choose one from them, we as-
sume that the advertiser uses secure bidding for ad slot ‘∗ . Thus, his
bid is bSi ‘;p
i
‘
 
.
The greedy bidding strategy mentioned above is summarized as fol-
lows. Let b be a current bid proﬁle and i be an advertiser obtaining ad
slot k. The secure greedy bidding (SGB) is the following bid adjustment:
• Let ‘∗ be the smallest element in argmax‘∈ 1;:::;Kþ1f gα‘ vi−p‘ð Þ.
• If ‘∗≦K , i submits bSi ‘∗;pi‘∗
 
.
• If ‘∗ ¼ K þ 1, i submits vi.
Cary et al. ([5,6] and Bu et al. [4] separately analyzed SGB and
showed that the unique ﬁxed point of the SGB is b∗. Moreover, they
also show that for any bid proﬁle b0, there exists a ﬁnite sequence of
bid proﬁles starting from b0 and endingwith b∗ such that in each period,
one bidder changes its bid via SGB.
Asynchronous SGB dynamics presents a situation where, in each peri-
od, one advertiser is randomly selected, and he changes his bid
according to SGB. The following proposition holds.
Proposition 6. For any bid proﬁle b0, the convergence to b∗ occurs with
probability one in asynchronous SGB dynamics [5,4].
Next, we consider a SGB adjustment model with a search for other
bids. Let q be the probability that an advertiser i = d(k) ﬁnds the
price of each ad slot in a search period. As a result of the search, the ad-
vertiser knows the price of ad slots in B, which is a subset of {1, …, K,
K + 1}. B must be non-empty because k + 1 ∈ B and K + 1 ∈ B al-
ways hold. Advertiser i chooses secure bidding to acquire the ad slot
in argmax‘∈Bα‘ vi−p‘ð Þ in the next period.
Let b be a current bid proﬁle and i be an advertiser obtaining ad slot
k. The secure partial greedy bidding (SPGB) is as shown in the following
bid adjustment.
• Let B be the set of ad slots the prices of which are detected in a search
period, where the price of each slot is detected independently with
probability q.
• Let ‘∗ be the smallest element in argmax‘∈Bα‘ vi−p‘ð Þ.
• If ‘∗≦K , then i submits bSi ‘∗;pi‘∗
 
.
• If ‘∗ ¼ K þ 1, then i submits vi.
If q = 1, this is identical to asynchronous SGB dynamics. Even
though B is determined by (K − 1) independent random trials, there al-
ways exists some positive probability (=qK − 1) such that B = {1,…, K,
K + 1}. This means that the bidders choose the same bid as in SGBwith
positive probability. Coupled with the fact that there exists a ﬁnite se-
quence of bid proﬁles starting from any initial bid proﬁle and ending
with b∗ such that in each period one bidder changes his bid via SGB,
the following proposition can be induced.
Fig. 3. Average time of convergence of SBT, SPGB, and SGB as a function of N (δ = 0.7).
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7. Comparison among SBT, SGB, and SPGB
We now have three different bid adjustment strategies: (1) SGB for
the open-bid environment and (2) SBT and (3) SPGB for the sealed-bid
environment. A prominent feature common to these three is that they
have the same ﬁxed point (b∗) of bid adjustment dynamics. Thus, to ob-
tain further insight, we need to investigate how these three are different
before arriving at the ﬁxed point. Since convergence to the ﬁxed point is
guaranteed by Propositions 4, 5, and 6, a comparison among the three
can be a fair method to evaluate to what extent the sealed-bid environ-
ment is beneﬁcial or harmful to advertisers and the search engine rela-
tive to the open-bid environment.
To see how these three bid adjustments are different, I run a com-
puter simulation. In the simulation, the number of slots equals the num-
ber of advertisers, and the CTR is chosen as the geometrically decreasing
sequence by αk = δk − 1 for all k given some δ ∈ (0,1). For each param-
eter selection on the discount rate (δ), the number of advertisers (N),
and the detection probability to others' bids (q), I take 200 instances,
where, in each instance, the values of advertisers are chosen from a nor-
mal distribution with μ = 500 and s.d. = 200 following Cary et al. [5].
7.1. Convergence speed of SGB, SPGB and SBT
Fig. 2 plots the average time before the convergence of SBT, SPGB
(with detection probabilities 0.75, 0.59, 0.10), and SGB as a function
of δ, where δ is calibrated from 0.50 to 0.95 in steps of 0.05, ﬁxing
N = 10. First, this indicates that in all ﬁve bidding strategies, the
time before convergences increases as the values of CTRs become
denser, that is, as δ approaches 1. This is because when the values
of CTRs across ad slots are dense, advertisers' bids also tend to be-
come dense, implying that bid adjustment to the ﬁxed point is
more difﬁcult. A similar observation is also found in Cary et al. [5]
using a different bidding strategy. Second, even though the greedy
bidding is imperfect in a sealed-bid environment, SPGB with middle
or high detection probability shows a similar convergence speed to
that of SGB. On the other hand, SPGB with low probability and SBT
converge at a lower rate compared to SGB, and this becomes clearer
as δ approaches 1.
The second observation still holds even when we change the num-
ber of advertisers. Fig. 3 plots the average time before the convergence
of SBT, SPGB (with detection probabilities 0.75, 0.50, 0.10), and SGB,
as a function of N. I ﬁx δ = 0.7 because this value has proven to be
well-ﬁtted in practical data [12]. Here, the average time of convergence
is divided byN in order to eliminate the direct effect of the increase inN,
given that as only one advertiser changes his bid, the increase in N nec-
essarily increases the time before convergence. Fig. 3 indicates that in all
cases, the time before convergence increases non-linearly as a function
of N; this interpretation is consistent with Theorem 1, at least for SBT.Fig. 2. Average time of convergence of SBT, SPGB, and SGB as a function of δ (N = 10).In the simulation results displayed above, I choose only three detec-
tion probabilities. Thus, it is unclear when the convergence speed of
SPGB becomes largely different from that of SGB. Fig. 4 plots the average
timebefore the convergence of SPGB as a function of detection probabil-
ity q, where q is calibrated from 1 to 0.05 in steps of 0.05, ﬁxingN = 10,
20, 30 and δ = 0.7. This indicates that there is a kink near q = 0.15. For
the interval greater than this kink, the average time of convergence is
moderately elevated as q decreases. However, it rises steeply in the in-
terval less than the kink. This is quite surprising and can be a positive re-
sult since even though in the sealed-bid environment, the convergence
speed is not so different from that in the open-bid environment (if ad-
vertisers follow the greedy bidding strategy).
7.2. Payoff and revenue comparison in open- and sealed-bid environments
Even though convergence to equilibrium is guaranteed, the average
payoffs for advertisers and the average revenue of a search engine be-
fore the convergence are of concern to both parties, because the changes
in parameters such as CTRs, values, and thenumber of advertisers, entail
a change in equilibrium bids, and such changes in parameters occur fre-
quently in practice.
Fig. 5 plots the average payoff of advertisers and the revenue of a
search engine before convergence to equilibrium in open-bid and
sealed-bid environments. First, this indicates that when we compare
SGB and SPGB, an advertiser's payoff in SPGB is smaller than that in
SGB, and this decreases as the detection probability decreases. For a
search engine, the relationship is completely reversed. That is, the
search engine's revenue in SPGB is larger than that in SGB, and this in-
creases as the detection probability decreases. Comparing SGB and
SBT, the same relationships hold for both the payoffs and the revenue.Fig. 4. Average time of convergence of SBT, SPGB, and SGB as a function of q (δ = 0.7).
0Fig. 5. Average payoffs for advertisers and revenue of a search engine before convergence relative to equilibrium payoffs and revenue, respectively (N = 10, δ = 0.7).
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engines and disadvantageous to advertisers, at least in the time before
equilibrium has been attained.
Second, comparing SPGB and SBT (the two bidding strategies for a
sealed-bid environment), an advertiser's payoff in SPGB is considerably
larger than that in SBT, and the inverse relation holds for the search en-
gines. In addition, while the payoffs of advertisers in SPGB before the
convergence are greater than the equilibrium payoffs, those in SBT are
not. In contrast, the revenue in SBT till the convergence is greater than
the equilibrium revenue, but that is not the case in SPGB. This seems
to be consistent with the bidding war that can occur before the conver-
gence (see subsection 4.3).
This analysis suggests that advertisers should use SPGB rather than
SBT. Moreover, the effort expended to detect the bids of others rewards
the advertisers. For the time before convergence, search engines can ex-
ploit advertisers in a sealed-bid environment.
8. Conclusion
In this paper, I explored the types of bidding behavior in a sealed-bid
keyword auction. I ﬁrst showed that secure bidding (where the bidder
does not search for information on the bids of other advertisers) has
several limitations. Then, I considered secure bidding with minimal ex-
ploration through a trial bid (SBT) and showed that the ﬁxed point of
SBT is uniquely determined and that the dynamic bid adjustment
according to SBT converges to the ﬁxed point with probability one.
An imperfect version of the greedy bidding strategy (SPGB)was also
investigated and the convergence result still holds for SPGB.
A computer simulation showed that a search engine can beneﬁt
from a sealed-bid environment. Advertisers can improve their payoffs
by switching from SBT to SPGB. One reason is that the search for a ben-
eﬁcial lower ad slot may decrease bids, and thus, reduce the price of ad
slots until the ﬁxed point is realized. A similar observation is reported
from Cary et al. [29] who compared the greedy bidding among all ad
slots and one where a bidder searches only the lower ad slots. They
ﬁnd that the latter is more proﬁtable to advertisers than the former.
However, the switch from SBT to SPGB will be costly to advertisers be-
cause detecting others' bids is more difﬁcult than checking the alloca-
tion. In addition, it seems that an automated bidding agent that
searches for others' bids is prohibited by a search engine; as of March
2012, no Internet advertising agency provides such a service.9
I conclude by discussing other reasons for a search engine to use a
sealed-bid auction. First, a sealed-bid environment prevents adver-
tisers from antisocial or spiteful bidding, whereby an advertiser
bids slightly lower than the bid of the advertiser in the targeted
position. Liang and Qi [20] and Zhou and Lukose [28] suggested
that antisocial bidding was observed in the data from Yahoo! when9 In the time where Yahoo! used an open-bid keyword auction, there were automated
bidding services that utilized others' bids (e.g., GapJammer) [16].it used an open-bid environment and theoretically proved that anti-
social bidding leads to instability of bids in a dynamic auction. In
other words, combined with our theoretical ﬁnding, this indicates
that a sealed-bid environment may validate using an envy-free equi-
librium to analyze the market of keyword auctions. Second, under a
sealed-bid environment, advertisers tend to engage in a competition
in differentiation by, for example, improving the quality of advertise-
ments or ﬁnding more attractive keywords rather than competing in
bidding. This implies that advertisers can avoid price competition
that is not beneﬁcial in the long run. In addition, competition in dif-
ferentiation by advertisers can also beneﬁt a search engine because it
creates a marketplace for online advertisements. Thus, if advertisers
compete only in the bidding for some given keyword, the advertisers
and a search engine are in a zero-sum situation where the surplus
generated from the keyword is constant and the problem is how to
divide the surplus between advertisers and a search engine. In con-
trast, a competition in differentiation can lead to a win–win relation-
ship between them.
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